Why Metapsychology

Abstract

Against the background of the reformulation of psychoanalysis as neuro-psychoanalysis this article asks if and how Freudian metapsychology is needed in order to capture the critical potential of psychoanalysis. By outlining a parallel to Adorno’s arguments on behalf of Philosophy, the article examines Freud’s own definitions of metapsychology. It demonstrates both, the potentials of metapsychology to think the dialectic of human nature and culture and its incompability with a positivistic approach to Psychoanalysis by discussing the earlier Freudian concepts of »experience of satisfaction« and »Lebensnot«. This argument is contrasted with a critical investigation of »The Brain and the inner world« by Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, both pioneers of Neuro-Psychoanalysis. In conclusion it seems clear that metapsychology constitutes a disturbing concept and this is precisely the reason it needs to be appreciated.